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Challenges to Ms Davis' Statement of the Case, Nature of Case: 
The vast majority of those sections of Ms Davis' Brief are mere argument, 
unsupported by any reference to the record. See, Brief of Appellee / Cross-
Appellant, hereinafter referred to as, "Ms Davis' Brief. Where there is a refer-
ence, it goes to documents entered years before this matter. Id. Ms Davis makes 
one reference to the current record, Record at 530, to support her allegations about 
Mr. Davis' alleged failure to support her before the divorce (in 2002), and in fail-
ing to make mortgage payments. Id. Yet, the Record at 530 shows no mention of 
those matters, and fully fails to support Ms Davis' allegations. The only other ref-
erence, Record at 19 - 20, is an affidavit of Ms Davis, dated March 20, 2002, 
which is well before the divorce itself, let alone any issue pending herein. 
Challenges to Ms Davis' Statement of Relevant Facts: 
1. At 5 1, Ms Davis' Brief, p. 7, Ms Davis relates alleged facts which, 
per her own statements, occurred prior to the initial divorce, which was in 2002. 
Record at 19 - 20. The Record, at 530, does not address those alleged facts. 
2. Again, 5 2, Ms Davis' Brief, p. 8, alleges facts which, per her own 
statements, occurred prior to, or were addressed in, the initial divorce. 
3. In 5 3, Ms Davis' Brief, p. 8, she discusses conditions that existed at 
the time of the divorce, and makes accusations concerning visitation, which was 
not part of the case below, nor is it part of this appeal. The Transcript, at p. 5, lines 
7 - 1 3 , does not mention the children, or visitation, as alleged. It should be noted 
that the Trial Court does not start taking any evidence from Ms Davis, until page 
52 of the Transcript, which is when she was sworn in to testify; the entire tran-
script, prior to that page, deals with a review of pleadings, or instruction to the par-
ties on how to proceed. Transcript, p. 1, line 1, through p. 25, line 19. 
4. As to the allegations raised in JJ 4, Ms Davis's Brief, p. 8, the Record 
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cited by Ms Davis does not show that she was, "forced to move from her home 
where she lived with her three young children, due to foreclosure." 
5. The Record does not support Ms Davis's assertion, raised in 5 9, Ms 
Davis's Brief, p. 9, that Mr. Davis' bankruptcy was filed, "well after Corey filed 
the Petition for Modification..." 
6. The Record fails to support Ms Davis's assertion, raised in 5 10, Ms 
Davis's Brief, p. 9, that, "the court found that the only significant and material 
change in circumstances since the entry of the original Divorce Decree was that 
Corey's income ha[d] been reduced approximately 29%." Emphasis added. In 
fact, the trial court found that Mr. Davis' income was reduced, "approximately 
30%", Record at 529,5 19; Mr. Davis, "received a discharge in bankruptcy...", Re-
cord at 530, 5 13; Ms Davis, "could work full-time and impute[d] income to her at 
minimum wage of $940.00 per month", Record at 529, 5 17; and, that Mr. Davis 
was, "the primary financial contributor to the cost of raising the children... [such] 
that the Decree should be modified to entitle Respondent [Mr. Davis] to claim the 
youngest child, Cierra as an exemption...", Record at 527 5 28. These additional 
findings on significant changes are noted, and admitted by Ms Davis, in JflJ 12 - 14 
of Ms Davis' Brief. 
7. The Record fails to support Ms Davis' assertions, raised in Ms Davis' 
Brief, p. 9, and JJ 16. Her claims about suffering the economic effects of Mr. 
Davis' bankruptcy was not testimony, but a mere review of issues. Transcript p. 
24, lines 16 - 24. In fact, all she stated was that the bankruptcy was not on the 
credit report until after 2005 Trial. Transcript p. 24, lines 14-15. As noted, in 5 3, 
above, Ms Davis was not sworn until page 52, of the Transcript. Also, the Record, 
at 677 - 678, fails to support her claims that she was sued, and forced to make pay-
ments on debts that Mr. Davis was allegedly ordered to pay. 
8. It is interesting to note that Ms Davis admits that she, "and her chil-
2 
dren have not been able to live in a home of their own for the last nine years be-
cause of her ruined credit..." Ms Davis' Brief, p. 10,5 16. Yet, Mr. Davis' bank-
ruptcy occurred only seven (7) years ago, in 2003. 
9. At p. 10, J 17, Ms Davis' Brief, Ms Davis omits the fact that the first 
change she alleged, as the basis for the remainder of her claims for relief, was that, 
"Respondent [Mr. Davis] filed a bankruptcy and no longer is paying the debts he 
was ordered to pay." Record at 559,5 2A. 
10. Ms Davis omits, at Ms Davis' Brief, p. 11, 5 21, that she did not file 
her request to adjust child support until November 23, 2008. Record at 601, and 
specifically, at 599,5 14. 
11. Ms Davis repeats the allegations she made at 5 16, in $ 25, Ms Davis' 
Brief, p. 12. Mr. Davis reiterates the fact that the Transcript, p. 24, was not testi-
mony, it was mere review of issues. See, 5fU 3, and 7, hereinabove. 
12. The Transcript fails to show that she was sued by credit card compa-
nies on bills owed by Mr. Davis, as alleged in Ms Davis' Brief, p. 12, 5 26. That 
section of the Transcript cited by Ms Davis, shows a discussion of Exhibit 7, 
pleadings by a collection agency, but the Transcript does not show any correlation 
between Exhibit 7 and any debt related to Mr. Davis. 
Argument 
General Rebuttal: 
Throughout her brief, Ms Davis mischaracterizes Mr. Davis' issues as being 
challenges to the Trial Judge's findings. She then argues that Mr. Davis failed to 
meet his burdens, and, as such, this Court should deny the relief Mr. Davis re-
quests. 
Ms Davis spends almost the entirety of her brief arguing that Mr. Davis 
failed to marshal the facts (Ms Davis' Brief, pp. 18 - 24, 25 - 27, 30 - 31, and 33 -
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38), or Mr. Davis failed to preserve the issue at the trial court level (or failed to ob-
ject) (Ms Davis' Brief, pp. 24 - 25, 27 - 30, and 31 - 33). Those arguments merely 
support Ms Davis' misrepresentations of the issues. As will be shown, when each 
issue is individually discussed, Ms Davis failed to address the legal issues raised 
by Mr. Davis; that the Trial Court erred in its readings, or interpretation of the per-
tinent statutes, and their application to the matter at hand. 
As a general response to Ms Davis' claims of failure to marshal evidence, or 
challenges to the Trial Court's finding, Mr. Davis understands the difference be-
tween challenging the Trial Judge's findings, and his interpretation, and applica-
tion of the law. It is the Trial Judge's interpretation, and application, of statute, 
which Mr. Davis alleges to be error. Mr. Davis does not argue that the Trial judge 
added two (2) and two (2), to come up with five (5) (an allegation of findings un-
supported by the facts, as alleged by Ms Davis). Mr. Davis is saying that, regard-
less of what number the Trial Judge determined, he erred in his application of the 
pertinent law to those facts. 
The Trial Court Judge's decision addressed various statutes, or legal doc-
trines. Record at 677 - 679. Mr. Davis asserts that the Trial Court Judge erred in 
his interpretation, and application, of the law to the facts of this case. This Court, 
"review[s] a trial court's statutory interpretation for correctness, according it no 
particular deference. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 
1992)." State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 493 (Utah App. 1993). See also, 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48,5 44, 89 P.3d 97; Brewster 
v. Brewster, 2010 UT App. 260,5 19; Trubetzkoy v. Trubetzkoy, 205 P.3d 891, 894 
(Utah App. 2009) 2009 UT App. 77 5f 6; and, Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 
(Utah App. 1994). Even Ms Davis admits questions of law do not require marshal-
ing. See, Ms Davis' Brief, p. 19. 
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Turning now to Ms Davis' preservation arguments, Ms Davis does correctly 
state that,,"[a]s a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal." State v. Holgate 10 P.3d 346, 350 511 (Utah 2000). That is, 
"unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 
'plain error' occurred." Id. 
"The plain error exception enables the appellate court to 'balance the 
need for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.' State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 122 n. 12 (Utah 1989). 'At bottom, the plain error rulefs pur-
pose is to permit us to avoid injustice.' Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 35 n. 8. To 
demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n error exists; 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more fa-
vorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in 
the verdict is undermined.' Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09." 
State v. Holgate 10 P.3d 346, 350 JJ 13 (Utah 2000). See also, State v. Tar-
nawiecki, 5 P.3d 1222, 1226 (UT App. 2000), and State v. Dean, 95 P.3d 276, 280 
5 15 (Utah 2004). 
Mr. Davis' Brief, as well as his argument herein, shows the Trial Court's er-
rors exist; the errors should have been obvious to the Trial Court; and, the errors, 
each individually addressed below, harmed Mr. Davis. Having established plain 
error, all of Ms Davis' arguments, and claims, based on a failure to preserve, must 
fail, regardless of where they exist in Ms Davis' Brief. 
Point One: Standards for Modifying Prior Final Orders: 
Mr. Davis asserts that, if the issues in the current petition for modification 
were addressed, or modified in a prior order, then the changed circumstances stan-
dard applies to changes that occurred since that last order modifying the decree, 
not all the way back to the original decree. See, Mr. Davis1 Brief, pp. 17 - 19. 
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For example, let us assume that Mr. & Mrs. Jones are divorced in 2001, with 
Mrs. Jones being granted custody of the children, and that Mr. Jones obtains an or-
der modifying that decree in 2003, granting him custody of the children. If Mrs. 
Jones now files a petition to modify custody, she must meet the standard of prov-
ing a change in circumstance relating to a change in Mr. Jones' ability to care for 
the children; the facts and circumstances as of the 2003 order. The trial court does 
not consider changes in circumstance before that 2003 time. 
To do so would be ludicrous, as then the custody standard would revert to 
Mrs. Jones having to show a change in circumstances relating to her, not Mr. 
Jones', ability to care for the children. Such a change would simply reverse the 
standard of requiring the change in the custodial parent's ability to parent, contrary 
to Utah's stated standard. 
Applying that logic to the instant case, the Trial Court should have allowed 
only changes in circumstances since the 2005 Order, without any relation back to 
the original Decree. The 2005 Order addressed all issues raised herein, and at the 
Trial Court. 
Ms Davis alters Mr. Davis' claim from that of the legal issue, to an alleged 
challenge to the Trial Court's Findings. Ms Davis argues, almost exclusively, that 
Mr. Davis failed to marshal the facts. Ms Davis' Brief, pp. 18 - 24. However, as 
this issue appears to be an unresolved legal issue, there is no requirement for the 
marshaling of evidence. See, Mr. Davis' General Rebuttal section, above. 
Mrs. Davis is correct that Mr. Davis did not cite authority exactly on point to 
his position. Mrs. Davis' Brief, p. 21. In fact, Mr. Davis admitted such. Mr. 
Davis' Brief, p. 18. That is because Mr. Davis was unable to find any binding 
authority in Utah, on this issue. Id. Contrary to Ms Davis' argument {see, Ms 
Davis' Brief, p. 22), Mr. Davis' Brief does cite Utah statute, and case law pertinent 
to the issue. See, Mr. Davis' Brief, pp. 17 - 18. 
6 
When a matter before this Court, "is an issue of first impression in Utah 
courts and we look to Utah statutory provisions for guidance." State of Utah v. 
Child Support Enforcement, 888 P.2d 690, 692 (Utah App. 1994). Under that doc-
trine, this Court reviews Utah's statutes. Id. The controlling statute is §30-3-5(3), 
Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), which states, "[t]he court has continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the chil-
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of 
the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary." As such, 
that statute is not helpful. 
Mr. Davis, in searching the neighboring states' case law, which, even if di-
rectly on point would not be controlling on this Court, located only two (2) cases, 
both being in Idaho. Jensen v. Jensen, 917 P.2d 757 (Idaho, 1996), and Rohr v. 
Rohr, 911 P.2d 133 (Idaho, 1996). Both cases addressed the fact that the trial court 
is to consider changed circumstances since the last order modifying the divorce de-
cree. Jenson, 917 P. 2d at 758, and Rohr, 911 P. 2d at 137. However, it appears 
that the statutory authority granted those courts, unlike Utah's statute, specified 
changes since the last decree. Rohr, 911 P.2d at 137. 
Ms Davis also asserts Mr. Davis inadequately briefed this point. "An issue 
is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to 
shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." See, State v. 
Smith, 2010 UT App. 231 5 3, _ P.3d _ (citation omitted). This Court indicated 
that inadequately briefed means the brief lacks, "reasoned analysis based upon 
relevant legal authority," see, State v. Sloan, 72 P.3d 138, 141, 2003 UT App 170, 
5 13; and, "because it is devoid of any meaningful analysis . . ." see Washington v. 
Kraft, 2010 UT App 266 5 7 (unpublished opinion, internal citations omitted). 
In State v. Smith, the brief in question consisted solely of, 
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"a cursory summary of the argument, but it does not contain an argument 
section. The summary itself is a scant paragraph requesting this court to 
'consider the requirements of due process of law,' followed by a list of con-
stitutional rights. This argument is followed by a one-sentence conclusion 
stating, 'The Defendant/Appellant invokes his right to appeal and asks the 
appellate] court to determine if his rights as an accused were granted and 
due process of law allowed.'" 
State v. Smith, 2010 UT App 2315 2. The result was that the brief was stricken, 
with a remand to appoint new counsel to submit a new brief. State v. Smith, 2010 
UTApp2315 7. 
In Washington, the Plaintiff's brief completely ignored a Utah Supreme 
Court case, from approximately twenty (20) years earlier, which was directly on 
point. Washington, 55 5 - 6. 
Both cases rely on State v. Sloan, 72 P.3d 138 (Utah App. 2003), which re-
lies on Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370,5 8, 995 P.2d 14. State v. Sloan quotes 
directly from Smith. State v. Sloan, 72 P.3d 138,142, 2003 UT App 170,5 13. 
In Smith, the brief consisted of: 
1. three arguments, supported by five, "points", without citing a 
single legal authority and only obliquely referring to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and to a general concept of due process in arguing that the court-
appointed custody evaluator should not have been allowed to testify. Smith, 
1999 UT App 370,5 10,995 P.2d 16. 
2. a second point failing to cite relevant legal authority. In argu-
ing that the trial court should not have issued a protective order that had the 
effect of limiting discovery, she quotes only one case. The language cited is 
a general statement about a policy of fairness behind discovery rules, but 
provides no grounds for comparison to the facts of Appellant's case. Smith, 
1999 UT App 370,5 11,995 P.2d 16. 
3. a third point, approximately one-half (lA) page in length, con-
taining little more than a quote from Rule 35(b)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and arguing that Appellant should have received a report from the 
evaluator, when the record clearly showed that she had received that report. 
Smith, 1999 UT App 370,5 12, 995 P.2d 16. 
4. A fourth point merely rehashes the previous argument. Smith, 
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1999 UT App 370, J 13,995 P.2d 17. 
5. The fifth and final point presented by Appellant, cites the Utah 
Constitution's Due Process Clause [2], and several Utah cases dealing with 
apparently unrelated matters. Smith, 1999 UT App 370,5 15,995 P.2d 17. 
The Smith brief also ignored a relevant section of Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, that was on point in that case. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, J 14,995 P.2d 17. 
In all of those cases pertinent law had been clearly established years prior, and 
none of the issues presented were of first impression. In the instant case, Mr. Davis 
cited some legal authority, case law, and statue, framing the issue. See, Mr. Davis' 
Brief, pp. 17 - 19. Mr. Davis was unable to point to an authoritative Utah source 
directly on point. Plus, Ms Davis, despite all of the cases cited by her, does not pre-
sent to this Court any case, or statute, that refutes Mr. Davis' proposition. 
Mr. Davis' argument was sufficient for Ms Davis to present a lengthy, and de-
tailed response, which clearly shows that she understands the issue. As such, she is 
not prejudiced; it is not as if Mr. Davis was raising the issue for the first time, in oral 
argument. 
Point Two: Application of Res Judicata to Claims Concerning a Prior Bankruptcy: 
Ms Davis ignores the issue raised. See, Ms Davis' Brief, pp. 24 - 25, and 25 
- 27, respectively. She shifts the Court's attention to her claims of lack of preser-
vation, and that the Trial Court Judge's findings are adequate (a failure to marshal 
evidence claim). Id. As to those general claims, and allegations, Mr. Davis reiter-
ates herein, his arguments set out in the General Rebuttal section. 
On the preservation issue, Mr. Davis raised the concept of res judicata, a 
number of times to the Trial Court. See, Mr. Davis' Brief, pp. 21 (citing the Re-
cord at 527, 529 - 530, 535 - 536, 562 - 566, and Transcript at p. 23, lines 2 - 13; 
p. 24, lines 2 - 9; p. 28, lines 17 - 23; p. 30, lines 1 - 8; p. 78, lines 6 - 10; and, p. 
107, line 5, through p. 108, line 21). True, Mr. Davis did not use those exact 
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words, for Mr. Davis did not know the term, res judicata. Having raised the issue 
of the prior bankruptcy, and prior review of Ms Davis' claims, the Trial Court even 
commented thereon, stating: 
"[t]o be frank with you, you presented me with a bit of a thorny issue. Mr. 
Davis has declared bankruptcy. And that's provided for, believe it or not, in 
the US Constitution. ... Bankruptcy is to provide a clean slate. So I'm con-
cerned that if I take into account the bankruptcy the way you're asking me to 
do it, that I am essentially using that as an excuse to change the child tax de-
ductions, which will have a financial impact on Mr. Davis, and, therefore, 
I'm backdooring the bankruptcy law. And to tell you the truth if I do it and 
it's wrong, I can get held in trouble for ignoring the effect of the bankruptcy 
law." 
Transcript, p. 107, lines 7 - 2 1 . The Trial Court based its award of the use of the 
children, as tax exemptions, directly on that 2003 bankruptcy. Record at 677, 673, 
and 671 - 672 (2010 Findings, p. 3,J lp. 7, J 2, and p. 8, fl 1, through p. 9). Ms 
Davis' testimony was that, due to the 2003 bankruptcy, she should be awarded all 
the children, as dependents for tax purposes. Transcript, p. 57, lines 1 2 - 2 1 ; and, 
p. 94, lines 3 - 14. 
Going to the actual issue, Ms Davis, citing Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51,53 
(Utah, 1982), Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407,410 (UT App. 1990), and Throckmor-
ton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah App. 1988), agrees that, "the doc-
trine of res judicata applies in divorce actions, and subsequent modification pro-
ceedings." Ms Davis' Brief, p. 26 5 1- Ms Davis also agrees that, "a domestic re-
lations order may be modified and the policy concerns underlying the doctrine of 
res judicata will be safeguarded if a trial court modifies a divorce decree only after 
finding changed circumstances." Ms Davis' Brief, p. 26,5 2, citing Kelley v. Kel-
ley, 2000 UT App 5 21, 9 P.3d 171, Hogge, 649 P.2d at 53 - 54, Hiush v. Munro, 
2008 UT App. 283 55 12-15,191 P.3d 1242, and Smith, 793 P.2d at 410. 
The real issue is, and this ties in with Mr. Davis' first issue, does res judicata 
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require that the material change of circumstances must have occurred since the last 
order modifying the decree of divorce, or can the trial court go back to the original 
decree? Our case law states that, "principles of res judicata require that 'a party 
seeking modification of a divorce decree must demonstrate that a substantial 
change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree, and not con-
templated in the decree itself.' " Krambule v. Krambule, 994 P.2d 210, 214 5 13 
(Utah App. 1999) (citations omitted). 
This Court, in Krambule, affirmed the application of the doctrine of res ju-
dicata in divorce modifications. As all of the support claims were based on facts 
known to the parties before the entry of the original decree, those claims, "should 
have been asserted in the original divorce action and is therefore now barred under 
the principles of res judicata." Krambule, 994 P.2d at 215,5 16. 
Just like in Krambule, Ms Davis knew, at the time of the 2005 Trial, and 
2005 Order, of the 2003 bankruptcy, and all the potential effects thereof, including 
the potential for creditors suing her, and her credit rating being damaged, back in 
2003, 2004, and 2005. In fact, Ms Davis admits, and complains that she, "and her 
children have not been able to live in a home of their own for the last nine years 
because of her ruined credit..." Ms Davis' Brief, p. 6, 5 2 (emphasis added). As 
she lived with, and knew about such a problem for nine years, her claims that her 
credit was damaged, being pursued by creditors, or having to pay on those marital 
debts, were known to her, or capable of being known to her, at the 2005 Trial. 
Plus, she had counsel appearing for her at that 2005 Trial. Record at 533, and 538. 
Just like in Krambule, Ms Davis should have raised those claims during the 
2005 Trial. As such, under Krambule, Ms Davis' burden was to show a material 
change in circumstances since the entry of the last order; in the case of Krambule, 
it was the decree, id; in this case, it should have been the 2005 Order. And, as that 
2005 Order resulted from a trial, the Smith v. Smith exception, about non-litigated 
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matters (see, Smith, 793 P.2d at 410), does not apply. 
As Ms Davis argues, the Trial Court's findings were mostly based on Mr. 
Davis' 2003 bankruptcy specifically, the bankruptcy materially affected Ms Davis' 
financial condition; because of the bankruptcy, creditors are pursuing Ms Davis; 
Mr. Davis did not pay the marital debts which were discharged; and, the bank-
ruptcy deprived Ms Davis of the benefit of the 2002 stipulation. See, Ms Davis' 
Brief, pp. 20 - 21. As to material changes in circumstances, Ms Davis argued that 
Mr. Davis' alleged, "failure to pay certain debts [which] had adversely affected 
Lisa [Ms Davis]..." Ms Davis' Brief, p. 35,5 2. Those debts were the debts dis-
charged in Mr. Davis' Bankruptcy. 
In Krambule, this court ruled that those prior claims for support were barred 
by the doctrine of res judicata. Krambule, 994 P.2d at 217, 5 17. In exactly the 
same manner, this Court should rule that all of Ms Davis' claims which were based 
upon, or granted because of, the 2003 Bankruptcy, are barred by that doctrine. 
Point Three: Modification of Child Support Obligation: 
Despite admitting the legal nature of Mr. Davis' claims, see Ms Davis' Brief, 
pp. 2 7 - 2 8 , Ms Davis' defenses, and assertions, go to the usual arguments about 
preservation, and failure to marshal the facts. See, Ms Davis' Brief, pp. 27 -30, 
and 3 0 - 3 1 , respectively. Mr. Davis realleges herein, his general arguments about 
preservation, and the differences between legal, and factual challenges, as set forth 
in his General Rebuttal. 
Mr. Davis' actual position is that the Trial Court violated §78B-12-210, Utah 
Code Annot. (1953, as amended), when it adjusted his child support upward. See, 
Mr. Davis' Brief, pp. 22 - 24. The question goes to the material change of circum-
stances, and the fact that §78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended) 
states a difference in the support amount of ten-percent (10%), or more, and the 
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change in Mr. Davis' support was only nine-percent (9%). Id. 
That argument takes this Court into the realms of interpretation, and applica-
tion of statute; in other words, plain error. This Court, "review[s] a trial court's 
statutory interpretation for correctness, according it no particular deference. State 
v. Vigil 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992); State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 
App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992)." State v. Masciantonio, 850 
P.2d 492, 493 (Utah App. 1993). See also, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Green, 2003 UT 48,J 44, 89 P.3d 97; Brewster v. Brewster, 2010 UT App 260, 5 
19; Trubetzkoy v. Trubetzkoy, 205 P.3d 891, 894 (Utah App. 2009) 2009 UT App 
77 5 6; and, Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036,1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that, "(D a n error ex-
ists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant." State v. Dean, 95 P.3d 276,280 (Utah 2004) 5 15. See 
also, Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993), State v. Holgate 10 P.3d 346, 
350 5f 13 (Utah 2000). See also, State v. Tarnawiecki, 5 P.3d 1222, 1226 (UT 
App. 2000). 
Mr. Davis challenged the Trial Court on this issue. He put into evidence a 
letter from Office of Recovery Services (Trial Court, Exhibit 3), as well as testi-
mony (Transcript, at p. 78, line 23 - p. 79, line 7) about not meeting that ten-
percent (10%) change. Even Ms Davis admitted to the Trial Court that she knew 
of that bright-line limitation, and the fact that such a change would not be shown. 
See, Ms Davis' Brief, p. 29,$ 2. See also, Transcript, p. 53, lines 1 - 3 . As such, 
the statutory limit was placed before the Trial Court, yet the Trial Court decided to 
rule contrary to statute. 
On its face, the Trial Court's ruling does not comply with the guidelines, 
and no findings to rebut the guidelines were pronounced by the Trial Court. And, 
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Mr. Davis would have had a more favorable outcome had the Trial Court not made 
that error — his child support would not have been increased. 
Point Four: Retroactive Application of Child Support Obligation: 
Ms Davis' entire argument against Mr. Davis' assertion is based upon an al-
leged failure to preserve the issue. See, Ms Davis' Brief, pp. 31 - 33. She does not 
refute Mr. Davis' assertion, claim, or argument; and, she fails to show any evi-
dence, or cite any authority, contradicting Mr. Davis' argument that the Trial Court 
violated §78B-12-112(4), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), in ordering 
changes in child support to be retroactive to April 4, 2008, (Record at 724), when 
Ms Davis did not request that change, until November 23,2009, (Record at 599). 
As noted in the General Rebuttal section, "[a]s a general rule, claims not 
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate 10 P.3d 
346, 350 5111 (Utah 2000). That is, "unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'ex-
ceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. The general argu-
ment, and case law cited therein, is reasserted herein by reference 
Turning to this specific issue, Mr. Davis' Brief certainly gives notice that the 
Trial Court's extended retroactive application of the modified support amount was 
plain error, on its face. The error exists. The Trial Court made the modified child 
support order retroactive to a date nineteen (19) months prior to the date Ms Davis 
requested the change in child support. No one can argue that this did not happen, 
and Ms Davis does not deny this point. 
Pursuant to statute, "[a] child or spousal support payment under a support 
order maybe modified with respect to any period during which a modification is 
pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading on the obligee, if the ob-
ligor is the petitioner, or on the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner." Section 
78B-12-112(4), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). 
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"Initially, this court examines a statute's 'plain language and resort[s] to 
other methods of statutory interpretation only if the language is ambiguous.' State 
v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 493 (Utah App. 1993); see also State v. Larsen, 
865 P.2d 1355,1357 (Utah 1993). We attempt to construe a statute using its 'plain 
language' because it is the 'best indication of legislative intent.' Luckau v. Board 
of Review, 840 P.2d 811, 815 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Berube v. Fashion Cen-
tre, 111 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989))." State v. Child Support Enforcement, 888 
P.2d 690, 692 (Utah App. 1994). This rule of construction is conceded by Ms 
Davis. See, Ms Davis' Brief, pp. 27 - 28. 
With those rules of construction in place, when one turns to the controlling 
statute, §78B-12-112(4), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), one sees that its 
language is clear; its prohibition against retroactively modifying a support pay-
ment, before service of the pleading requesting the change, is unambiguous. That, 
"plain language", gives this court the, "best indication of legislative intent." Id. 
The Trial Court cannot make child support retroactive past the date of service of 
the pleading requesting the change upon the other party. 
The Trial Court's power in awarding a modified child support obligation ret-
roactively is authorized, and limited by that statute, §78B-12-112(4), Utah Code 
Annot. (1953, as amended). When the Trial Court went beyond the limits of §78B-
12-112(4), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), in awarding retroactive child 
support to be effective, on a date almost nineteen (19) months before Ms Davis re-
quested the change, the Trial Court committed error. Plain error. 
The error should have been obvious to the Trial Court. Section 78B-12-
112(4), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), is, nor was, newly established, it 
has been in place since 1987 (having previously been designated at §30-3-10.6, 
and §78-45-9.3, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended)). The legislative language 
is clear; the statute's meaning is unambiguous. The legislature's words are used 
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precisely; the plain language of the statute is that, there cannot be any order for 
support made to begin before the date the request for the change is served. That is 
the date of service, easily determined from the Trial Court's docket, and the file. 
Not only was the Trial Court's order in violation of statute, it was also harm-
ful to Mr. Davis. Because of that erroneous order, Mr. Davis was required to pay 
Ms Davis nineteen (19) months of child support, at the higher rate of $1,287.00, 
per month. Mr. Davis was financially damaged by that erroneous order. 
Point Five: Requirement for Reimbursement of School Expenses: 
Mr. Davis is challenging the Trial Court's interpretation, and application of 
§78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot, (1953, as amended), in this matter. See, Mr. 
Davis Brief, pp. 26 - 28. Mr. Davis is not arguing that the Trial Court made inade-
quate findings, as Ms Davis alleges. See, Ms Davis' Brief, pp. 34 - 36. Mr. Davis 
is arguing that the Trial Court erred, as a matter of law, in requiring him to reim-
burse Ms Davis for one-half Q/i) of the children's school, or extracurricular, ex-
penses. 
This Court, "reviewfs] a trial court's statutory interpretation for correctness, 
according it no particular deference. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 
1992); State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 
476 (Utah 1992)." State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 493 (Utah App. 1993). 
See also, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48,5J 44, 89 P.3d 97; 
Brewster v. Brewster, 2010 UT App 260, % 19; Trubetzkoy v. Trubetzkoy, 205 P.3d 
891,894,2009 UT App 77 J 6; and, Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036,1038 (UT App. 
1994). 
Ms Davis cites this Court to three (3) cases, as support for her position that 
the Trial Court did not err in ordering Mr. Davis to pay one-half QA) the children's 
school fees, clothing, and extracurricular costs, in addition to child support. See, 
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Ms Davis' Brief, p. 35. Those cases are: Anderson v. Thompson, 176 P.3d 464, 
2008 UT App 3; Arnold v. Arnold, 111 P.3d 89, 2008 UT App 17; and, an unre-
ported case, Gillette v. Costa. 
The Arnold case is very pertinent, as in it, this Court clearly sets forth the 
general rule regarding school, and such related, expenses. In fact, Arnold affirms 
Brooks v. Brooks 881 P.2d 955 (UT App. 1994), the case cited by Mr. Davis in 
support of his proposition. As such, Arnold supports Mr. Davis' position that, but 
for the fact that Mr. Arnold had previously agreed to pay one-half (V2) the costs of 
the child's private school, school expenses are part and parcel of the child support 
order. Arnold, 111 P.3d at 91. 2008 UT App. 17 3J10. 
In Arnold, the parties were attempting to modify a prior order, which re-
sulted from the parties' stipulation and agreement, wherein Mr. Arnold agreed to 
pay one-half (V2) the costs of sending a child to private school. Arnold, 111 P.3d at 
90„ 2008 UT App. 17 5f 3. Arnold states the general rule that, 
"it is not appropriate for a district court to award private school expenses in 
addition to child support. See Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955, 959 n.3 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (treating private school expenses as 'part and parcel of the 
child support award'); see also Star ley v. McDowell, 1999 UT App 46U, 
para. 10. (mem.) (affirming child support order that did not require noncus-
todial parent to pay half of private school tuition)." 
Arnold, 111 P.3d at 91. 2008 UT App. 17 5110. 
That is the general rule in Utah. Id. It is just that Mr. Arnold had agreed 
otherwise, and this Court held him to that agreement to pay one-half (V2) of the pri-
vate school expenses. Id. In the instant case, Mr. Davis has not made any such 
agreement; in fact, he argued the contrary. Transcript, p. 32, lines 14-25. 
Anderson v. Thompson, 176 P.3d 464, 2008 UT App 3, involves a case 
where the wife (Ms Anderson) obtained an order against the husband (Mr. Thomp-
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son) finding him in contempt of court, granted the wife judgment for the children's 
non-school expenses, and awarded the wife attorney fees. Anderson, 176 P.3d at 
467, 2008 UT App 3 5 1- In Anderson, the provisions concerning the additional 
payments of support for the children, beyond the child support obligation, includ-
ing non-school extracurricular fees, appear to have been originally obtained 
through agreement of the parties. Anderson, 176 P.3d at 467, 2008 UT App 3 5f 3. 
The court simply enforced the agreement of the parties; the court did not impose 
the payment of the children's non-school expenses, in addition to the statutory 
child support previously ordered. Anderson, 176 P.3d at 470, 2008 UT App 3 5 20. 
Arnold, and Anderson are distinguishable from the instant case. There is no 
agreement to pay beyond the child support obligation; and, there is no agreement 
to pay for the children's non-school expenses. Instead, the Trial Court, in violation 
of statute, and contrary to Brooks, and Anderson, ordered Mr. Davis to reimburse 
Ms Davis one-half (V2) of the school expenses. 2010 Order, 5 8. Record at 723. 
Gillette v. Costa, 2007 UT App 104, 2007 WL 858711 (not reported), the 
third case cited by Ms Davis as support for her assertion that this Court upheld a 
lower court's order that the father pay for extracurricular activities, and schooling, 
is likewise distinguishable. In Gillette, this Court did not reach the merits of the 
appeal. See, Gillette, ^ 3 (as this is an unreported case, a courtesy copy is attached 
hereto, in the Addendum, p. 39). Instead, this Court dismissed the appeal, pursuant 
to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, due to Gillette's inadequate brief-
ing. See, Gillette, 5J5 5, and 6. Having dismissed Gillette, due to inadequate brief-
ing, it did not address this issue. It does not support Ms Davis' position. 
Ms Davis correctly asserts that the child support guidelines are guidelines. 
Ms Davis' Brief, p. 36, n. 6. However, she fails to show that the guidelines were 
rebutted, or that the Trial Court complied with §78B-12-210 (3), Utah Code Annot. 
(1953, as amended), which states that, 
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"[a] written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclu-
sion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award 
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, 
or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut 
the presumption in that case." 
The Trial Court did not make any such findings. It never rebutted the pre-
sumption that the guidelines apply. As set forth in §78B-12-210 (2), Utah Code 
Annot. (1953, as amended), 
"(a) The guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establish-
ing or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support, (b) 
The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations re-
quired by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the application 
of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines 
are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this sec-
tion." 
Ms Davis fails to show that the Trial Court rebutted the presumptive use of 
the statutory guidelines. The 2010 Findings, and the transcript itself, fail to even 
mention those guidelines. 
As to material changes in circumstances, Ms Davis argues only that Mr. 
Davis' alleged, "failure to pay certain debts [which] had adversely affected Lisa 
[Ms Davis]..." Ms Davis' Brief, p. 35,5J 2. Those debts were the debts discharged 
in 2003, and, as such, Ms Davis should have raised those claims in the 2005 Trial. 
As she did not raise those claims in the 2005 Trial, all of Ms Davis' argu-
ments fail. The Trial Court erred in ordering Mr. Davis to pay one-half QA) of 
school, or extracurricular activities, be they for Ms Davis, or the children, as the 
Trial Court was not specific in its 2010 Order. 
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Point Six: Requirement for Reimbursement of any Child Related Expenses Without 
Proof of Payment: 
Mr. Davis challenged the Trial Court's interpretation, and application of 
§78B-12-212, Utah Code Annot, (1953, as amended). Mr. Davis' Brief, pp. 28 -30. 
This Court, "review[s] a trial court's statutory interpretation for correctness, 
according it no particular deference. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 
1992); State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 
476 (Utah 1992)." State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 493 (Utah App. 1993). 
See also, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48,5 44, 89 P.3d 97. 
See also, Brewster v. Brewster, 2010 UT App 260,5 19, Trubetzkoy v. Trubetzkoy, 
205 P.3d 891, 894 (Utah App. 2009) 2009 UT App 77 JJ 6, and Wells v. Wells, 871 
P.2d 1036,1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
From the time of the initial Decree of Divorce, in 2002, up to the 2010 Find-
ings, and 2010 Order, Ms Davis was required to provide Mr. Davis written verifi-
cation of the cost and payment of medical expenses, in order to be reimbursed by 
Mr. Davis for one-half (W) of such expenses, as required by §78B-12-212, Utah 
Code Annot, (1953, as amended). Section 78B-12-212, Utah Code Annot, (1953, 
as amended) states, in pertinent parts, that, 
"[t]he order shall include a cash medical support provision that re-
quires each parent to equally share all reasonable and necessary uninsured 
and unreimbursed medical and dental expenses incurred for the dependent 
children, including but not limited to deductibles and copayments", 
"[a] parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verifi-
cation of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent 
within 30 days of payment", and, 
"[i]n addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent 
fails to comply with Subsections (7) and (8)." 
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§§78B-12-212 (6), 78B-12-212 (8), and 78B-12-212 (9), Utah Code Annot, (1953, 
as amended), respectively. 
That statute has been in effect, without any significant change to the perti-
nent portion, since its enactment in July, 1994. It was, at that time, §78-45-7.15, 
Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). It did, and still does, state, "[a] parent 
who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment." 
§78B-12-212(8), Utah Code Annot., (1953, as amended). Emphasis added. Yet, 
for unknown, and unstated, reasons the Trial Court decided that it had the power to 
exceed statute, and removed the mandatory verification of payment from Ms 
Davis' responsibilities in this matter in its 2010 Order. 
"The term 'shall' is generally "presumed mandatory' and has 'a usually ac-
cepted mandatory connotation' that requires strict compliance with the other statu-
tory terms. See Board of Educ, 659 P.2d at 1035; see also Barnard v. Mansell, 
2009 UT App 298,J 7, 221 P.3d 874 (stating that 'shall' is a 'mandatory word')." 
Brewster v. Brewster, 2010 UT App 260, J 19. 
"In undertaking statutory construction, 'we look first to the plain language of 
a statute to determine its meaning. Only when there is ambiguity do we look 
further.' MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2006 UT 25, 5 12, 134 
P.3d 1116 (alteration in original) (quoting J. Pochynok Co, v. Smedsrud, 
2005 UT 39, 5 15, 116 P.3d 353). We 'assume[] that the terms of a statute 
are used advisedly and should be given an interpretation and application 
which is in accord with their usually accepted meanings.' Board ofEduc. of 
Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983)." 
Brewster, 2010 UT App. 260 J16. 
"When interpreting statutory language, we first examine the statute's plain 
language and resort to other methods of statutory interpretation only if the 
language is ambiguous. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992); State 
v. Singh 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 
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(Utah 1992). In addition, we construe the statute to give effect to legislative 
intent in so far as possible, and in doing so, assume 'the Legislature used 
each term advisedly, and we give effect to each term according to its ordi-
nary Page 494 and accepted meaning/ Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l. Cos., 
842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992)." 
State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, at 493 - 494. See also State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. DeHerrera, 2006 UT App 388, 145 P.3d 1172 (Utah App. 2006). 
So, what we have here is precedent that this Court uses common language, 
whenever such language is unambiguous; that the word, "shall", is a mandatory 
statement, and carries a mandatory connotation; and, that a statute should be read 
in its whole, for a congruent understanding. Doing so with §78B-12-212, Utah 
Code Annot. (1953, as amended), on the issue of reimbursing one party for uncov-
ered medical expenses, yields the facts that: 1. Parents share equally all such un-
covered costs; 2. The person incurring a medical expense shall (which is a manda-
tory statement, i.e. that person must) provide written confirmation of the cost, and 
payment of that expense to the other parent; and, 3. Should the parent incurring the 
expense fail to do so, that parent may be denied reimbursement of one-half i}/i) of 
the medical expense. 
The statutory language is clear, and unambiguous. The provision of written 
confirmation of the cost, and payment, of a medical expense is required. There is 
no permissive aspect to that statutory requirement. And, for the Trial Court to ab-
rogate that statutory requirement is error, plain and simple. (Mr. Davis has dis-
cussed the "plain error", issue elsewhere herein. See pp. 5, 13 - 14, above). 
Ms Davis' sole argument on point, was that the trial court has discretion to 
establish payment methods under §78B-12-212, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as 
amended)- Yet, they cite only the, "may", language of §78B-12-212 (9), Utah 
Code Annot. (1953, as amended). That section deals only with a potential penalty 
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for a party's failure to comply with statute. Ms Davis ignores §78B-12-212 (8), 
Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), which uses the mandatory, "shall", in rela-
tion to providing verification of cost and payment. That enforcement section, 
§78B-12-212 (9), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), is not what Mr. Davis 
raises. 
Ms Davis' point that a parent's responsibility for payment of such an ex-
pense is created when the expense is incurred, seems correct. But that liability is to 
the provider. §78B-12-212(6), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). Ms Davis 
seeks reimbursement for her alleged payment to the provider. Per §78B-12-212(8), 
Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), a right to reimbursement arises only after 
Ms Davis provides the proof of incurring, and paying, the bill to Mr. Davis. 
The language of §78B-12-212(8), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended) is 
clear. It mandates that a, "parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide writ-
ten verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent 
within 30 days of payment". 
"The term 'shall' is generally 'presumed mandatory' and has 'a usually ac-
cepted mandatory connotation' that requires strict compliance with the other statu-
tory terms. See Board of Educ, 659 P.2d at 1035; see also Barnard v. Mansell, 
2009 UT App 298, J 7, 221 P.3d 874 (stating that 'shall' is a 'mandatory word')." 
Brewster, $19. 
The 2010 Order is clearly contrary to statute. No basis was given, by the 
Trial Court, for that variation from statute. And, the statute contains the, "pre-
sumed mandatory", requirement that Ms Davis shall provide verification of not 
only the cost, but also the payment, of medical expenses to Mr. Davis in order to 
qualify for reimbursement from him. 
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Point Seven: In denying Ms Davis' request for attorney fees, the Trial Court did 
not abuse its discretion: 
A. Standard when the court does not award fees: 
Ms Davis correctly states that an award of attorney fees is discretionary. 
This Court has often stated that, "[wjhere a trial court may exercise broad discre-
tion, we presume the correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice 
or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of ... discretion.' " Crockett v. Crockett, 
836 P.2d 818, 819-20 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 
1055, 1056 (Utah Ct. App. 1987))." Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341, 348 2001 UT 
App 318,538. 
"To recover attorney fees and costs in modification proceedings 'the 
requesting party must demonstrate his or her need for attorney fees, the abil-
ity of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees.' Larson, 
888 P.2d at 726. Utah appellate courts have reversed attorney fee awards 
where the requesting party has failed to show any one of these factors. See, 
e.g., Hoaglandv. Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (cit-
ing Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Utah 1987)); Hagan v. 
Hagan, 810 P.2d 478,484 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)." 
Wilde , 35 P.3d 349, 2001 UT App 318, 539. The Wilde, standards are restated in 
Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1996), Kimball v. Kimball, 211 P.3d 
733, 2009 UT App 233, and Mark v. Mark, 223 P.3d 476, 2009 UT App 374. 
Those citations provide a simple answer to Ms Davis' question. She cited 
Mark for the proposition that the Trial Court must address the three prongs stated. 
The actual quotation showing such support is, "[if a trial court uses its broad dis-
cretion to award attorney fees, '[s]uch an award must be based on sufficient find-
ings addressing the financial need of the recipient spouse; the ability of the other 
spouse to pay; and the reasonableness of the fees.' Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 
41,5 12, 974 P.2d 306." Mark v. Mark, 223 P.3,476,488,2009 UT App. 521. 
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However, the next two (2) sentences in Mark, which Ms Davis did not cite, 
provide the resolution to Ms Davis' issue. They are: "In this case, the trial court 
did not award attorney fees; rather, it ordered that '[e]ach party shall be responsible 
for their own legal fees and costs associated with this action.' Because it awarded 
no attorney fees, the trial court was not required to make factual findings support-
ing the same." Id. In the instant case, "[attorneys fees are denied." Record, 723. 
With the exception of Mark, all cases cited by Ms Davis, in support of her 
proposition that the Trial Court erred in denying her an award of attorney fees, are 
distinguishable. Some involve a review of the lower court's award of attorney 
fees. See, Connell v. Connell, 233 P.3d 836, 843, 2010 UT App 139 5 26; and, 
Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah App. 1996). Others involved cases 
where, for whatever reasons, the trial court entered detailed findings supporting its 
decisions to deny requests for attorney fees. See, Kimball v. Kimball, 217 P.3d 
733, 2009 UT App 233; and Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341, 348, 2001 UT App 318 
5 38. Clearly on the facts of the instant case, the Trial Court was not required to 
make factual findings concerning its denial, see Mark, and it did not make any, as 
in Kimball, or Wilde. 
"If a trial court uses its broad discretion to award attorney fees, '[s]uch an 
award must be based on sufficient findings addressing the financial need of 
the recipient spouse; the ability of the other spouse to pay; and the reason-
ableness of the fees.' Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, J 12, 974 P.2d 306. 
In this case, the trial court did not award attorney fees; rather, it ordered that 
'[e]ach party shall be responsible for their own legal fees and costs associ-
ated with this action.' Because it awarded no attorney fees, the trial court 
was not required to make factual findings supporting the same." 
Mark, 223 P.3, at 488,2009 UT App. J 21 
"Because it awarded no attorney fees, the trial court was not required to 
make factual findings supporting the same." Id. That is exactly what happened in 
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the case below. The Trial Court stated, "[attorney fees are denied." Findings, 5 
10. The 2010 Order, which was drafted by Ms Davis' counsel, states, "[attorney 
fees are denied." 2010 Order, J 11. Because the Trial Court awarded no attorney 
fees, it was not required to make factual findings supporting that finding. See, 
Mark. Ms Davis' claim must fail. 
B. Even if the Trial Court was required to make findings to support its denial, 
Ms Davis failed to marshal the evidence: 
Ms Davis faces an extremely difficult task, as does any party who challenges 
a trial court's finding. Ms Davis spent a great deal of time, in her Brief, addressing 
the burden one faces when one claims the trial court abused its discretion in mak-
ing a finding. See Ms Davis' Brief, pp. 18 - 24, 25 - 27, 30 - 31, and 33 - 38. 
"[T]he marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to merely have pertinent 
excerpts from the record readily available to a reviewing court. The mar-
shaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must 
extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the ad-
versary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious or-
der, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array 
of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evi-
dence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate 
court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Id. (emphasis in original). The marshaling requirement is not satisfied if 
parties just list all the evidence presented at trial, or simply rehash the argu-
ments on evidence they presented at trial. See Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT 
App-189,5 12, 51 P.3d 724, cert denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002)." 
Kimball v. Kimball, 217 P.3d 733, 743, 2009 UT App 233 J 21. 
Ms Davis never marshaled the evidence as required under Kimball, all she 
did was to, "just list all the evidence presented at trial, or simply rehash the argu-
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ments on evidence they presented at trial." Id. Ms Davis never produced any evi-
dence supportive of the findings she resists — that the Trial Court's denial of at-
torney fees to both parties was appropriate, based upon the facts before the court. 
As she failed to appropriately marshal the evidence, this Court should not consider 
her claim. See, Covey v. Covey, 80 P.3d 553, 560, 2003 UT App. 380,5 27. See 
also, Ms Davis' Brief, p. 20, J 1; 24,5 1; p. 30,52; p. 34,55 1 - 2; and, p. 36,5 2, 
through p. 38. 
Furthermore, "[t]o recover attorney fees and costs in modification proceed-
ings 'the requesting party must demonstrate his or her need for attorney fees, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees.' Larson, 888 
P.2d at 726." Wilde, 35 P.3d at 349, 2001 UT App. 5 39. That means that it was 
Ms Davis burden to prove that her testimony met all three prongs. Yet, nowhere 
does she show that she ever discussed a, "need", for attorney fees, any discussion 
about Mr. Davis' ability to pay those fees, or indeed, the, "reasonableness of the 
fees". That is due to the fact that there was no such testimony, the Transcript is 
devoid of such. 
Ms Davis failed to show that the evidence before the Trial Court met any of 
the three prongs she had to meet in order to recover any attorney fees. Ms Davis' 
request must fail. 
C. Standards to meet to award fees: 
In the alternative, should this Court consider a decision contrary to Mark, 
including the potential of a remand for detailed findings, then this Court must con-
sider its standards, and whether Ms Davis made timely objection, so as to put the 
Trial Court on notice, thereby preserving the issue; appropriately marshaled the 
evidence, as her claims challenge the Trial Court's Findings of Fact; and, appropri-
ately addressed all three (3) prongs required for an award of attorney fees before 
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the Trial Court. 
"To recover attorney fees and costs in modification proceedings 'the re-
questing party must demonstrate his or her need for attorney fees, the ability of the 
other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees.' Larson, 888 P.2d at 726." 
Wilde, 35 P.3d at 349, 2001 UT App. 5 39. As noted immediately above, Ms 
Davis failed to meet those requirements. Only now, on appeal, does she talk about 
the, "reasonableness", of the fees (Ms Davis' Brief, pp. 42 - 44), or that she does 
not have the assets or resources to pay fees (Ms Davis' Brief, p. 46). 
As those claims were not laid before the Trial Court, Ms Davis cannot raise 
them now, for the first time, on appeal. See, Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307, 313, 
2001 UT App. 46, J 17. Nor should she be allowed to bring in such new evidence 
to the Trial Court, should this issue be remanded. Ms Davis had her opportunity at 
trial; this Court should not give her the proverbial, "second bite". If this issue is 
remanded, the Trial Court should be instructed to make findings, per the evidence, 
which was presented at trial, without taking any further testimony. 
On a side matter, Ms Davis brings up the differing standards for an award of 
attorney fees, at P. 41. In her footnote, Ms Davis raised the potential of an award 
under a "motion to compel" standard. However, the Trial Court addressed that is-
sue, and combined all of the pending motions into the trial, under Rule 15(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Record at 677, fn 1. See also, Transcript, p. 96, line 15, 
through p. 97, line 5. Ms Davis has made no objection to that ruling. 
Point Eight: Ms Davis' request for attorney fees on appeal: 
The cases Ms Davis cited do stand for the proposition that, if fees are 
awarded below, then this court will likely award on appeal. Yet, the court below 
ruled that attorney fees are denied. 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (UT App. 1994), does support the 
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concept that this Court can remand for a determination of fees, including fees on 
appeal. However, that is only if a party prevails on appeal. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 
at 604. And if so, "A prevailing party's claim for attorney fees on appeal based on 
an allegation of need must be addressed by the trial court to determine the need of 
the claiming spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, the reasonableness of 
the fees and the amount, if any, to be paid." Id. 
In the instant case, Ms Davis now, for the first time, raises the issue of as-
sets, in determining an award of fees. Ms Davis' Brief, p. 46,3J 1. There was no 
discussion of assets before the Trial Court. Ms Davis never presented any evi-
dence, or argument, concerning assets to the Trial Court. And, as noted in the pre-
ceding section arguing against attorney fees, Ms Davis did not place such evidence 
before the Trial Court, and this Court should not now allow her to present new evi-
dence on this issue. It was Ms Davis' burden of proof, upon which she failed. She 
should not be allowed to now take a, "second bite at the apple". 
Conclusion 
Ms Davis' misrepresentation of Mr. Davis' arguments is ineffective. Mr. 
Davis rebuts her misplaced arguments. Her failure to actually address any of the 
legal issues, solidifies Mr. Davis' position: The Trial Court erred in reconsidering 
the situation of the parties, in light of Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy, as that 2003 
Bankruptcy had already been addressed in the 2005 Order, and in considering 
changes in circumstances that had occurred prior to that 2005 Trial. 
As such, the doctrine of res judicata, specifically the doctrine of claim pre-
clusion, applied. The Trial Court should not have heard, or allowed, any of Ms 
Davis' claims which touched upon, or concerned Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy. 
Those claims include: The Trial Court's modifying the award of the use of the mi-
nor children as exemptions for tax purposes; modifying Mr. Davis' ongoing child 
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support obligation; and, ordering Mr. Davis to pay portions of schooling, and ex-
tracurricular activities. 
The Trial Court also erred in modifying Mr. Davis' child support, as there 
had not been the statutorily required change in the child support amount; in making 
any such change retroactive to the date of the original petition (April 2008), rather 
than when Ms Davis made the request (November, 2009). The Trial Court's modi-
fication was in violation of statute; and, in modifying the prior Orders to state that 
any reimbursement claims did not require proof of payment being given to Mr. 
Davis, was again in violation of statute. Furthermore, the Trial Court demonstrated 
no basis, nor rationale, for varying from those statutes. 
All of those errors involved matters of law, statutory interpretation, or some 
combination of the two. This Court should reverse all those errors. 
Ms Davis failed in meeting her burdens to support her claim for attorney 
fees, both in the Trial Court, and in this Court. All relief requested in Ms Davis's 
Cross-Appeal should be denied 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day of December, 2010. 
AVID R. HARTWIG, ESQ. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Certificate of Mailing 
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going Brief were deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and ad-
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Utah Statutes 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 12. Utah Child Support Act 
Current through 2009 Legislative Session 
§ 78B-12-112.Payment under child support order - Judgment. 
(1) All monthly payments of child support shall be due on the 1st day of each month pursuant to 
Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 3,Child Support Services Act, Part 4, Income Withholding in IV-
DCases, and Part 5, Income Withholding in Non-IV-D Cases. 
(2) For purposes of child support services and incomewithholding pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 
11, Part 3 and Part 4,child support is not considered past due until the 1st day of thefollowing 
month. For purposes other than those specified in Subsection (1) support shall be payable 1/2 by 
the 5th day of eachmonth and 1/2 by the 20th day of that month, unless the order ordecree pro-
vides for a different time for payment. 
(3) Each payment or installment of child or spousal supportunder any support order, as defined 
by Section 78B-12-102, is, on and after the date it isdue: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of anyjudgment of a district court, except as 
provided in Subsection(4); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in thisand in any other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any otherjurisdiction, except as provided in 
Subsection (4). 
(4) A child or spousal support payment under a support order maybe modified with respect to 
any period during which a modificationis pending, but only from the date of service of the plead-
ing onthe obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or on the obligor,if the obligee is the petitioner. 
If the tribunal orders that thesupport should be modified, the effective date of the modification-
shall be the month following service on the parent whose support isaffected. Once the tribunal 
determines that a modification isappropriate, the tribunal shall order a judgment to be entered 
forany difference in the original order and the modified amount forthe period from the service of 
the pleading until the final orderof modification is entered. 
(5) The judgment provided for in Subsection (3)(a), to beeffective and enforceable as a lien 
against the real propertyinterest of any third party relying on the public record, shall bedocketed 
in the district court in accordance with Sections 78B-5-202 and 62A-11-312.5. 
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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78B-12-210. Application of guidelines ~ Use of ordered child support. 
(1) The guidelines in this chapter apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or 
modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying 
the amount of temporary or permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the 
guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines, and the use of 
worksheets consistent with these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the 
provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that comply-
ing with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from use of the 
guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case 
is sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case. If an order rebuts the presumption through 
findings, it is considered a deviated order. 
(4) The following shall be considered deviations from the guidelines, if: 
(a) the order includes a written finding that it is a deviation from the guidelines; 
(b) the guidelines worksheet has: 
(i) the box checked for a deviation; and 
(ii) an explanation as to the reason; or 
(c) the deviation is made because there were more children than provided for in the guidelines 
table. 
(5) If the amount in the order and the amount on the guidelines worksheet differ by $10 or 
more: 
(a) the order is considered deviated; and 
(b) the incomes listed on the worksheet may not be used in adjusting support for emancipa-
tion. 
(6) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of that parent and 
are not children in common to both parties may at the option of either party be taken into ac-
count under the guidelines in setting or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsec-
tion (7). Credit may not be given if: 
(i) by giving credit to the obligor, children for whom a prior support order exists would have 
their child support reduced; or 
(ii) by giving credit to the obligee for a present family, the obligation of the obligor would in-
crease. 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the respective 
parents for the additional children. The obligations shall then be subtracted from the appropriate 
parent's income before determining the award in the instant case. 
(7) In a proceeding to adjust or modify an existing award, consideration of natural or adoptive 
children born after entry of the order and who are not in common to both parties may be applied 
to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied: 
(a) for the benefit of the obligee if the credit would increase the support obligation of the obli-
gor from the most recent order; or 
(b) for the benefit of the obligor if the amount of support received by the obligee would be 
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decreased from the most recent order. 
(8) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the previous three 
years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may move the court to adjust the amount of a child 
support order. 
(b) Upon receiving a motion under Subsection (8)(a), the court shall, taking into account the 
best interests of the child: 
(i) determine whether there is a difference between the payor's ordered support amount and 
the payor's support amount that would be required under the guidelines; and 
(ii) if there is a difference as described in Subsection (8)(b)(i), adjust the payor's ordered sup-
port amount to the payor's support amount provided in the guidelines if: 
(A) the difference is 10% or more; 
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature; and 
(C) the order adjusting the payor's ordered support amount does not deviate from the guide-
lines. 
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary for an adjustment un-
der this Subsection (8). 
(9) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to adjust the 
amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances. A change 
in the base combined child support obligation table set forth in Section 78B-12-301 is not a sub-
stantial change in circumstances for the purposes of this Subsection (9). 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (9), a substantial change in circumstances may include: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the employment potential and ability of a parent to earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; or 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the support of others. 
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into account the 
best interests of the child: 
(i) determine whether a substantial change has occurred; 
(ii) if a substantial change has occurred, determine whether the change results in a difference of 
15% or more between the payor's ordered support amount and the payor's support amount that 
would be required under the guidelines; and 
(iii) adjust the payor's ordered support amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines 
if: 
(A) there is a difference of 15% or more; and 
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature. 
(10) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (8) and (9) shall 
be included in each child support order. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Title 78B - Judicial Code 
Chapter 12 - Utah Child Support Act 
78B-12-212. Medical expenses. 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children be 
provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for medical expenses, 
the court or administrative agency may consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(c) coverage of the policy; and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the pre-
mium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. 
(4) The parent who provides the insurance coverage may receive credit against the base child 
support award or recover the other parent's share of the children's portion of the premium. In 
cases in which the parent does not have insurance but another member of the parent's household 
provides insurance coverage for the children, the parent may receive credit against the base child 
support award or recover the other parent's share of the children's portion of the premium. 
(5) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. 
The premium expense for the children shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by 
the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of chil-
dren in the instant case. 
(6) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and necessary unin-
sured medical expenses incurred for the dependent children, including but not limited to deducti-
bles and copayments. 
(7) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the 
other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or 
before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of 
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of 
any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date the 
parent first knew or should have known of the change. 
(8) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
(9) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent incurring medical ex-
penses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's 
share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with Subsections (7) and (8). 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Rebecca Gilletter 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
v. 
Steven Michael Costa, 
Respondent and Appellant, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20060808-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 2 2 , 2007) 
2007 UT App 104 
Fourth District, Provo Department, 054401077 
The Honorable James R. Taylor 
Attorneys: Steven Michael Costa, Aliso Viejo, California, 
Appellant Pro Se 
Steven C. Tycksen and Chad C. Shattuck, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and McHugh. 
PER CURIAM: 
Steven Michael Costa appeals from various decisions issued 
by the district court. We affirm. 
Costa first argues that the district court erred when it 
failed to modify an order regarding child support. Second, Costa 
argues that the district court erred when it ordered him to pay 
for extracurricular activities and schooling. Third, Costa 
asserts that he is entitled to a credit of $400.00 for alimony 
paid to Rebecca Gillette. Last, Costa requests that this court 
reverse an award of attorney fees. 
Costa's arguments are inadequately briefed. Rule 24(a)(9) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates that an 
"argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
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appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with 
citations to the authorities [and] statutes." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). Costa has failed to meet this duty and has not 
provided "adequate legal analysis and legal authority in support 
of [his] claims." Flower Homeowners Ass'n v. Snow Flowerf Ltd.f 
2001 UT App 207,H14, 31 P.3d 576 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Consequently, Costa's "assertions do not permit 
appellate review." Id. "While failure to cite to pertinent 
authority may not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it 
does so when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as 
to shift the burden of research to the reviewing court." State 
v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Therefore, we decline 
to address Costa's arguments on appeal. 
Moreover, we note that Costa has failed to marshal any 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. "In order to 
challenge a court's factual findings, an appellant must first 
marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support 
the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the 
court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1176, 100 P.3d 1177 
(quotations and citation omitted); see also Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal 
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). 
Instead, Costa "simply reasserts the evidence [he] presented to 
the district court and asks this court to reconsider the validity 
of that evidence. In fact, [Costa's] arguments are 'nothing but 
an attempt to have this [c]ourt substitute its judgment for that 
of the [district] court on a contested factual issue. This we 
cannot do.'" Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 216,117, 138 P.3d 63 
(mem.) (quoting Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380,1128, 80 P.3d 
553) . 
When a party fails to meet the marshaling requirement, this 
court may affirm the trial court's ruling "on that basis alone." 
Chen, 2004 UT 82 at 1180. Costa barely references the district 
court's factual findings, let alone marshals the evidence in 
support of such findings. Costa's failure to marshal any facts 
in this case provides this court with an additional basis to 
decline to address Costa's arguments. 
20060808-CA 2 
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order and award 
pillette costs pursuant to rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure* See Utah R. App. P. 34(a). 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
We deny Gillette's request for attorney fees pursuant to 
Utah Code section 30-3-10.4(4). See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
10.4(4) (Supp. 2006) ("If the court finds that an action under 
this section is filed or answered frivolously and in a manner 
designed to harass the other party, the court shall assess 
attorney's fees as costs against the offending party."). 
Gillette argues that this court should award attorney fees 
because the"appeal was filed in bad faith. This is not a case 
egregiously lacking in a reasonable factual or legal basis. See 
Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110,1114, 22 P.3d 1249 ("The sanction 
for filing a frivolous appeal applies only in 'egregious cases' 
with no 'reasonable legal or factual basis.'" (citation 
omitted)); see also Utah R. App. P. 33(a). 
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